Strengthening Intelligence Oversight in Romania  by Chirazi, Gianina
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  92 ( 2013 )  164 – 168 
1877-0428 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Lumen Research Center in Social and Humanistic Sciences, Asociatia Lumen.
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.08.653 
ScienceDirect
Lumen International Conference Logos Universality Mentality Education Novelty (LUMEN 
2013) 
Strengthening Intelligence Oversight in Romania 
Gianina Chirazia * 
aDoctoral Programs – Intelligence and National Security, National Intelligence Academy “Mihai Viteazul”,  
Odai Street, No. 20, District 1, 13, Bucharest, Romania 
Abstract 
The following paper evaluates the Romanian oversight of intelligence sector. The oversight mechanisms differ from one 
democracy to another; that’s why, we firstly should understand the relationship between the secrecy required for maintaining 
the value of the information and to protect the sources and methods and the democratic need to exert control over all public 
institutions. The hypothesis is that a democratic state imposes both a demanding factor of legislative oversight and, in the 
same time, a deterrent factor of the parliamentarian oversight. In order to prove my argument I will define oversight and how 
it can be explained the need in a democracy of legislative oversight over intelligence services. I will emphasize the relation 
between democratic principle of transparency and need to know of the people. The methodology I used is related to Romanian 
legislative oversight on intelligence. Intelligence oversight is a necessity and it does not impose only limits over the legislative 
oversight, but also deters parliamentarians from willing to deal with it. I will refer to oversight as supervision, seeking to 
determine the efficiency of the intelligence security and their capacity to successfully fulfil its mandate. 
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1. Background 
After September 11, the state of national and international security seems to have vanished, asking to the 
executive structures, in particular those of security, speed of reaction and adaptation. The readjustment and the 
transformation are imperative which do not apply only to executive structures, but also to legislative fora. The 
Parliament, although by its nature a forum of debate which takes time, should learn to become an active 
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institution of parliamentary control side, especially on security structures. In this context, special committees of 
control over the intelligence services have to retain a role in boosting this transformation. 
As the activity of Romanian intelligence structures have expanded in recent years, the Romanian intelligence 
oversight must be carried out with an efficient supervision. Under these circumstances, our current major 
deficiency derives from the work of parliamentary scrutiny. It can not provide an integral independent assessment 
and a rigorous analysis of those structures – to ensure that they operate within the law, that they have the 
necessary resources to perform their work effectively. To perform their work effectively means to protect us in 
front of the threats we face today. 
2. A theoretical descriptive approach 
In this context, I used in this paper a series of analyses carried out by the experts from the international 
foundation DCAF, a centre for security, development and rule of law, which permanently contributes to 
enhancing security sector governance through security sector reform. I followed their theoretical descriptive 
approach related to the oversight of intelligence sector in order to identify both our current challenges and the 
adequate recommendations in strengthening the intelligence oversight in Romania.  
One of their studies indicates that most states apply more or less a formal control, usually through 
parliamentary oversight committees. So, Parliament has specialized committees or subcommittees dealing with 
intelligence oversight (Romanian model). But there are also countries where they do not exist and the power of 
parliamentary committees on defense and armed forces is extended to intelligence. In addition to the relevant 
parliamentary committees or in their absence, some states have established commissions of intelligence control 
outside the Executive or the Government. Executive bodies or governmental control have a managerial or 
administrative role and tend to be less independent of the controlling structures, whose activity they control, than 
committees which comprise representatives from across the political spectrum. 
The study also finds that special form of intelligence oversight is influenced by the legislative traditions of a 
state, its political system and its own historical factors, too. 
We are aware of the fact that there is no single model of parliamentary oversight for all countries. Rules and 
practices that are accepted and effective in a place can be unthinkable or irrelevant in another, but there are in any 
scheme some common points: the oversight encompasses ex ante scrutiny, ongoing monitoring and ex post 
review, as well as evaluation and investigation.  
Oversight should be distinguished from control because the latter (like management) implies the power to 
direct an organization’s policies and activities. 
The main purpose of the oversight is to hold intelligence services to account for their policies and actions in 
terms of legality, property, effectiveness and efficiency. The process by which an oversight body holds an 
intelligence service accountable has usually three distinct phases: 
 The oversight body collects information about the intelligence service. 
 Based on this initial information, the oversight body engages in a dialogue with the intelligence service. 
 The oversight body issues findings and recommendations. 
The oversight can occur at several different points in time: at the outset of an operation that has been proposed 
but not yet undertaken (ex ante oversight), while the operation is under way (ongoing oversight) or after the 
operation has concluded (ex post oversight). 
The states create intelligence oversight systems in order to enhance democratic governance of the intelligence 
services (including their accountability to the electorate), to uphold the rule of law, and to ensure the 
effectiveness and efficiency of service activity: democratic governance and accountability, upholding the rule of 
law and effectiveness and efficiency. 
Due to the need of increasing the intelligence services’ ability of surveillance, Parliament must ensure that the 
extensive powers of the intelligence services do not contravene the rules and the principles of international 
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humanitarian law and human rights. Only a system of checks and counterbalance could the Executive or 
Parliament prevent from abusing intelligence for their own political purposes. 
In a democracy, the intelligence services must be effective, politically neutral (nonpartisan), adhere to a 
professional code of ethics in order to act in the context of a legal mandate, according to the legal, constitutional 
and democratic practices of the state. Typically, the control of intelligence services in democratic societies is seen 
as being less open and less developed compared to the control of other areas of state activity. Regardless of the 
particular form of intelligence oversight in their entire, democratic societies seek to maintain a balance between 
legal behavior and accountability of services for their own citizens through a regular control on the one hand, and 
the secrecy and efficiency protection of national security on the other (M rg rit, 2009). 
In any option, Parliament plays a key role in supervising the work of intelligence. Parliament needs the highest 
quality information to make the right decisions on national security. Parliaments are consuming information, but 
they also have a role to ensure: a) democratic legitimacy of intelligence, based on which parliamentary control 
can ensure the democratic rules of intelligence, b) prevention of abuse, given the degree of privacy used in the 
conduct of operations and therefore how the intelligence services carry out their duties, c) efficiency of the 
intelligence sector: Parliament is the final referee with regard to the work of security sector institutions. 
In any democratic state there is a perfectly normal and legitimate political secrecy, subject to parliamentary 
scrutiny, which only serves the interests of the state and citizens in a world on the one hand vulnerable to new 
threats and risks, internal and external, and furthermore obliged to base decisions at the executive level in the 
context of a thorough knowledge of the phenomenon of contemporary international political and military policy. 
Control and supervision exercised in a democratic society over intelligence are necessary and are of particular 
importance for several reasons: 
 Ensuring a balance between the security and civil liberties in adapting the legal framework to the needs of the 
industry and by imposing an appropriate degree of transparency of these structures; 
 Contribute significantly to reducing the level of suspicion of the population on intelligence activity which 
predominantly has a secret content; 
 Require monitoring by authorized institutions on how they are applied to specific measures which temporarily 
restrict the exercise of rights and freedoms, in order to prevent such abuses achievement; 
 Strengthen civil society belief that the intelligence services operate only constitutional basis and that the 
specific activities and objectives are in accordance with the legal provisions in the field; 
 Emphasize that the work of reform and transformation of information services is made pursuant to a legal 
framework developed in accordance with democratic provisions. 
Difficulty tackle intelligence surveillance and control in a democratic society is caused by many factors such 
as: alleged incompatibility between intelligence work and the characteristics of a democratic society; 
sometimes controversy over terms and concepts associated with this field; secrecy of many specific elements of 
intelligence; there is a relatively small literature that openly address the role of information into a democracy. 
According to the laws in force, a complex system of control and surveillance is exerted on them, in several 
directions: 
 Executive control, which in Romania is double-headed, with a preponderant role of the president in the 
security policy, is conducted by: The Supreme Council of National Defence (led by the President of Romania) 
- by organizing and coordinating the implementation of national security, to determine the main directions of 
activity, ways to exploit the information by approving organizational charts, operating regulations and 
budgets and the government. However, the Executive performs, according the general and special financial 
regulations, control of budget execution. 
 Parliamentary oversight, which has two dimensions: a general - achieved through debate and interpellation in 
Parliament by approving the budget and the work of parliamentary committees, and a special one - done 
through standing committees of both committees, according to the tasks assigned law. 
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 Legal supervision, which has two lines: one that refers to procedures for obtaining authorization / collection 
of information by a process involving the temporary exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms and one of 
those situations where employees of these structures are brought in front of court for exceeded statutory 
powers or restricting activity and unlawful infringement of rights; 
 An independent oversight - through media, petitions and complaints of citizens and their access to public 
information. To protect the rights and freedoms of citizens in their relations with public institutions was 
created Ombudsman. He is appointed by the Senate for a term of four years, based on applications submitted 
by any citizen, and seeks to solve legal issues, having access to classified documents and may require to 
public institutions and authorities to stop violating the rights and the freedoms of citizens and repair their 
damage. 
It is essential both to build and maintain effective the oversight of security intelligence activities on the 
executive side of government and to have independent oversight (parliamentary and non-parliamentary).  
The secrecy of intelligence work, its lack of exposure to judicial examination and comment, the threat to 
human rights posed by excessive surveillance, and the record of past wrong-doings, all point to the need for 
effective oversight of intelligence services by bodies independent of the government of the day. 
3. Results – challenges & recommendations 
The analyses carried out by the DCAF’s experts allowed me emphazing a series of main challenges which 
portrait Romanian frame: 
 The impact of the broader social and political context on intelligence oversight. 
 Parliamentarians are failing to serve as drivers of enhanced oversight. 
 Shortcomings of parliamentary oversight of intelligence in the region. 
 The creation of expert oversight bodies as a response to the shortcomings of parliamentary oversight of 
intelligence services. 
 A lack of transparency in the intelligence sector. 
 Limited budgetary and financial oversight. 
Some international capacity-building work is undermining progress towards greater oversight and accountability. 
Accordingly to this frame, I linked the challenges above with a series of recommendations, which our 
parliamentarians with oversight and legislative prerogatives in the intelligence sector should work:  
 Prioritise holding the Executive to account.  
 Uphold the rule of law and democratic constitutional order with regard to intelligence activities.  
Such duties should come before any party political considerations. 
The Romanian oversight bodies should redouble their efforts to engage with the public and ensure a greater 
level of transparency in their own work. This could be achieved through dissemination of public versions of 
reports and by holding periodic public hearings. 
Such measures are essential to promoting greater public confidence and understanding in both intelligence 
services and oversight processes. 
Lawmakers should consider creating expert oversight bodies to exist alongside parliamentary oversight 
committees. 
Such bodies would be given responsibility for the, in-depth, day-to-day independent oversight of intelligence 
services and could complement the work of parliamentary committees. 
The international community (EU and NATO) should provide further guidance on the minimum standards 
which should apply to intelligence services and their oversight, and should ensure that such standards are 
incorporated into accession criteria. 
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The expression of the efficiency of the security sector in Romania is given by the ratio of the national security 
and individual rights and freedoms to be waived. Optimal balance is given by a high level of individual freedom 
and security.  
In my opinion, this ratio can be maintained through the development and effective parliamentary control over 
the levers of the security sector, and particularly the secret service. 
Moreover, I appreciate that control mechanisms of intelligence must have:  
 An evaluative vector in order to monitor the quality of information dissemination process. 
 A constraint vector in order to enable appropriate measures under the infringement findings. 
 An ethical vector in order to enable institutions to establish ethical standards so that the individual rights and 
freedoms are achieved only as a last resort in cases strictly regulated by law. 
 A social vector, in order to enhance the dialogue between intelligence and civil society. 
Parliamentary and governmental structures that ensure democratic control and transparency of the security 
sector in Romania must not allow the practices that blatantly contravene international conventions on 
fundamental human rights, or to resist interrogation means, in particular torture to obtain the information. The 
fight against terrorism must be done with means both legal and legitimate, measure of legitimacy being given to 
the national interest. 
Optimizing management of the security sector is proportionally correlated with regulatory frameworks that 
provide legal limits to action. 
In other words, operational efficiency of the intelligence organizations given by extensive legal powers can 
not stand in an inverse proportion to civilian control as extensively on the legality and efficiency. 
National security sector efficiency quantifies the real value in human security, translated into welfare, safety 
and prerequisites for a sustainable development. Romania is obviously going through an extensive process of 
resetting the security sector as a whole, including major transformation of intelligence services - domestic, 
foreign and military – which has already been subject to public debate. 
4. Conclusions 
Taking into account the issues above, the current analysis leads to the conclusion that the fundamental premise 
of a Romanian efficient parliamentary oversight of intelligence activities should be built with:  
1. A fundamental reform of the legal system on national security and of the intelligence one. 
2. Adoption of the law on the supervision and control by the Parliament of security intelligence activity. 
3. Training and empowering a team of specialists and independent experts to provide competent expert, 
objective and impartial parliamentary oversight structures. 
4. Dissemination in suitable forms (culture, security spheres legislature, the executive and civil society). 
5. The establishment of parliamentary control with adequate training and knowledge controlled range. 
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